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Abstract 
 
 
 
We study the determinants of patent suits and settlements during 1978-1999 by linking 
information from the U.S. patent office, the federal courts and industry sources. Litigation risk is 
much higher for patents owned by individuals and smaller firms. Patentees with a large portfolio of 
patents to trade, or other characteristics that facilitate “cooperative” resolution of disputes, are less 
likely to litigate.  But post-suit outcomes do not depend on these characteristics. These findings 
show that small patentees are at a disadvantage in enforcing their patent rights since their greater 
litigation risk is not offset by more rapid resolution of their suits. Our empirical estimates of the 
heterogeneity in litigation risk can help develop private patent litigation insurance to mitigate the 
adverse affects of high enforcement costs. 
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1. Introduction 
The central purpose of the patent system is to provide R&D incentives, but there is growing 
concern among scholars and the business community that fragmented patent rights and strategic 
patenting behavior are preventing firms from conducting R&D effectively. The perception is that 
litigation is becoming increasingly difficult to avoid, pushing up patent enforcement costs.1  The fact 
that patent litigation grew extremely rapidly over the past two decades encourages this view. The 
number of patent suits rose by almost tenfold, with much of this increase occurring during the 1990’s.   
There is an extensive theoretical literature on why firms sue, but there is very little empirical 
evidence.2 The literature on optimal patent policy has been studied without much empirical 
connection to the explosion of patent litigation over the past decade.  In this paper we provide a solid 
empirical basis for evaluating what has happened in patent litigation and its implications for R&D 
incentives and patent policy. In particular, we show that the incidence of patent suits has not been 
rising, after controlling for the rapid increase in patenting itself and a shift toward more litigious 
technology areas, but also that it is concentrated in important ways in firms and patents with particular 
characteristics.3   
The analysis provides empirical support for a key game-theoretic prediction in the context of 
the theory of litigation - that repeated interaction facilitates cooperation.  Patent cases provide a 
unique opportunity to examine this prediction because case features are relatively well defined, 
allowing us to control for other aspects of disputes that might affect litigation risk, such as the 
economic value at stake.  Since the basic factors affecting cooperation and settlement bargaining are 
general, our analysis of patent litigation can provide insights for other areas of study where it would 
be more difficult to disentangle them.4  
                                                 
1 For example, see Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Eisenberg, 1999; Hall and Zeidonis, 2001; Shapiro, 
2001. 
2 Early theoretical work includes P’ng, 1983; Bebchuk, 1984; Priest and Klein, 1984; Spier, 1992. 
3 Since survey evidence indicates that the cost of patent suits that reach trial stage has grown 
substantially over the past decade (AIPLA, 2001), the overall burden of enforcement may well have 
risen. 
4 Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989) provide a good general discussion of the determinants of litigation. 
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In the patent context there are two main mechanisms by which disputants can settle without 
resort to the courts. The first is by “trading” intellectual property. This takes various forms, including 
cross-licensing agreements and patent exchanges, sometimes with balancing cash payments (Grindley 
and Teece, 1997). In fact, one motivation for accumulating patents may be to facilitate such trading 
(Hall and Zeidonis, 2001). The second mechanism that promotes settlement of disputes is the 
expectation of repeated interaction among patentees, either over time or in different markets. Game 
theory predicts that repeated interaction increases the incentive to settle disputes “cooperatively” - 
that is, without filing suits (e.g., Bernheim and Whinston, 1990; Tirole, 1994).5 
Three of our key findings are consistent with the view that trading and repeated interaction 
are important for patent dispute resolution. First, having a larger portfolio of patents reduces the 
probability of filing a suit on any individual patent, conditional on its observed characteristics, and the 
quantitative effect is large. For a (small) domestic unlisted company with a small portfolio of 100 
patents, the average probability of litigating a given patent is two percent.  For a similar company but 
with a moderate portfolio of 500 patents, the figure drops to only 0.5 percent.  This means that there 
are beneficial “enforcement spillovers” across patents within a given firm. Second, the portfolio effect 
is stronger for smaller companies, as measured by employment. For small firms, having a portfolio of 
patents is likely to be the key mechanism for avoiding litigation, whereas larger firms can also rely on 
repeated interaction in intellectual property and product markets to discipline behavior. Third, firms 
that operate in technology areas that are more concentrated (where patenting is dominated by fewer 
companies) are much less likely to be involved in patent infringement suits.  We also find evidence of 
a threat value associated with having control over many patents in an area: firms having portfolios 
that are large relative to the disputants they are likely to encounter are significantly less likely to make 
use of the courts. 
In theoretical models of litigation, settlement can occur at each stage of the legal process, 
beginning with the decision to file a suit and ending either with a post-filing settlement or 
                                                 
5 There is very little econometric evidence to support this basic prediction. A notable exception is 
Siegelman and Waldfogel (1999) who construct measures of repeat play and find evidence that 
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adjudication at trial. We show that the threat of court action (suits) is the primary mechanism through 
which such ‘sorting’ among disputes occurs. Post-suit outcomes - the probability of settlement and 
the patentee win rates at trial - are almost completely independent of these characteristics, and this 
helps to mitigate the private (and social) costs of enforcement. Also lowering the cost of enforcement 
is the fact that post-filing settlement rates are high (about 95 percent), and that most settlement occurs 
soon after the suit is filed, often before the pre-trial hearing is held. These findings are good news: 
most cases are settled quickly, before extensive legal proceedings consume resources. The bad news 
is that the more frequent involvement of smaller patentees in court actions is not offset by a more 
rapid resolution of their suits. 
Our findings imply that the enforcement process undermines the R&D incentives of small 
firms. They are the first direct evidence based on comprehensive litigation data, but they are 
consistent with earlier empirical studies. For example, Lerner (1995) shows that small firms avoid  
R&D areas where the threat of litigation from larger firms is high. Lanjouw and Lerner (2002) argue 
that the use of preliminary injunctions by large firms can discourage R&D by small firms, and this 
may apply to other legal mechanisms. Even if parties can settle their patent disputes without resorting 
to suits, the effective threat of litigation will influence settlement terms and thus, ultimately, the 
incentives to undertake R&D. 
Both the advantages of patent portfolio and company size in settling disputes, and the 
heterogeneity in litigation risk, point to the potential value of patent litigation insurance.  Insurance 
would enhance the ability of small firms and new entrants to enforce their intellectual property rights 
more effectively, and thus increase their bargaining power in licensing agreements and other forms of 
technology transfer. Currently there are a number of providers of litigation insurance in the United 
States and Europe. However, demand has been severely limited by high prices while, at the same 
time, profitability of insuring companies has been undermined by the widespread use of pooled prices. 
Concerns about the weak development of this market have recently been voiced in government and 
                                                                                                                                                        
reputation matters in various areas of litigation. 
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the public media.6 Our empirical analysis could be used to develop insurance pricing schemes that 
recognize the heterogeneity of litigation risk. 
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the construction of the data set and the 
empirical approach.  Section 3 presents non-parametric evidence on how patent portfolio size and 
other firm and patent characteristics affect suit filings and their outcomes. Section 4 presents 
econometric analyses of the determinants of litigation for infringement suits and post-suit settlement, 
and illustrates the heterogeneity in the predicted probability of suits for different profiles of patent 
holders and patents. Section 5 briefly discusses implications for pricing patent insurance. Concluding 
remarks summarize areas for future research. 
  
2. Data Description and Analytical Framework 
 We identify litigated patents from the LitAlert database produced by Derwent, a private 
vendor. This database is primarily constructed from information collected by the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO).  The data used include 13,625 patent cases filed during the period 1978-
1999.  Each case filing identifies the main patent in dispute, although there may also be other patents 
listed. We use only the main patent in most of our analysis, which gives a total of 9,345 patents 
involved in our sample of suits.  We then matched the Derwent data to information on all U.S. patent-
related cases (those coded 830) from the court database organized by the Federal Judicial Center 
(FJC).  This information includes the progress or resolution of suits as of the end of 1997.7 Detailed 
information about the litigated patents and the universe of patents, and their owners, was drawn from 
a number of PTO databases. 
When analyzing levels of litigation we adjust for both under-reporting and truncation in the 
Derwent data. The federal courts are required to notify the PTO of every case filing that involves a 
                                                 
6 For an interesting policy discussion of past experience in this area, see the Danish Ministry of Trade 
and Industry (2001) report. A recent media story appeared in the U.K. Financial Times (September 
14, 2001). 
7 The docket numbering was made consistent by hand, to allow merging. Discussions with the FJC 
indicated that some cases involving patents may be coded under other categories (e.g., the patent issue 
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U.S. patent, but under-reporting occurs in practice. Thus the patent office (and consequently Derwent) 
registers a subset of all patent cases. To estimate reporting rates, we take the number of cases filed 
according to Derwent divided by the number in the same year that are coded as a patent case by the 
FJC. Reporting rates stabilize in the 1990’s at about 55 percent. We find no evidence of selection bias 
in the under reporting by the courts to the PTO: there are no significant differences between reported 
and unreported cases for a range of variables in the FJC database.  Because we observe suit filings 
only through 1999, later cohorts of patents look like they are less litigated by construction. The lag 
structure for case filings for cohorts 1982-86 is used to adjust for this truncation. 
We generated a “matched” set of patents to act as a control group.  For each litigated patent, 
another was chosen at random from the set of all U.S. patents with the same application year and 
primary 3-digit U.S. Patent Classification (USPC) assignment. Therefore, the comparisons we present 
between litigated patents and matched patents largely control for technology and cohort effects.   
In order to identify the type of patent suit, we manually matched the owner of each litigated 
patent to a party in the suit.  A filed case is identified as an infringement suit if the patent owner is a 
plaintiff, and as a suit for declaratory judgement if the patent owner is a defendant (we do not analyze 
the latter in detail in this paper). This could be done for about 65 percent of the suits, of which about 
85 percent are infringement suits. Cases where the patentee is not identified as one of the litigants are 
included as infringement suits in most of the analysis, since they are likely to be suits brought either 
by an exclusive licensee or by a subsidiary or head office of the patent-owning entity. (For further 
details regarding data construction, see Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001b.) 
We focus here on the effects of size and repeated interaction on the incidence and outcomes 
of patent suits, but we also control for other factors identified by Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001a). 
The latter include the number of potential disputes, the value of what is at stake, and the cost of 
prosecuting a suit in a U.S. court. Turning first to the control variables, we have the following 
characteristics for each litigated and matched patent: 
                                                                                                                                                        
may be part of a broader contractual dispute).  This is also evident in the data where a small 
percentage of cases identified by Derwent are not in the FJC database. 
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Nationality of Patent Owner: We use the PTO designation of a patentee as domestic or 
foreign when it has been assigned to a company, and the address of the first listed inventor otherwise. 
Domestic patents account for 73.4 percent of the total. We expect domestic owners to have relatively 
lower costs of detecting and prosecuting infringements in the United States.  
Technology Field:  The USPC is a hierarchical, technology-based classification system.  A 
patent examiner assigns to each patent one or more of the 421 USPC 3-digit classes.  When a patent is 
assigned to more than one class, we use the first to identify the patent’s field of technology.  For most 
of the analysis we aggregate to eight broad technology groups: drugs, biotechnology, other health 
(mainly medical instruments), chemicals, electronics, computers, mechanical, and miscellaneous. The 
sum of a patent’s unique 3-digit class assignments is used as an indicator of its technological breadth. 
 Number of Claims:  The set of claims in a patent application delineates the boundaries of the 
property rights in the patent. The principal claims define the essential novel features of the invention, 
and the subordinate claims describe detailed features of the innovation claimed. The patentee has an 
incentive to claim as much as possible in the application, but the patent examiner can narrow claims 
before granting. We expect the number of claims to be associated with greater patent value, and thus 
more disputes. 
Citations:  An inventor must cite all related prior U.S. patents in his patent application, and a 
patent examiner is responsible for insuring that all appropriate patents are cited. Citations in the patent 
document help to define the property rights of the patentee.  For each patent in the litigated and 
matched data, we obtained the number of prior patents cited in the application (backward citations) 
and their USPC sub-class assignments. We obtained the same information on all of the subsequent 
patents citing a given patent in their own applications, as of 1998 (forward citations).  When a patent 
is assigned to a firm, we determine the share of forward and backward citations that are from the same 
firm (self-citation). Greater forward self-citation suggests that a patent protects an initial stage in a 
“cumulative innovation” developed by the patentee. Greater backward self-citation suggests that a 
patent protects a later stage in a cumulative chain. Both forward citation by others and self-citation 
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suggest that a patent is more valuable and thus more likely to be involved in suits, while greater 
backward citation (including self-citation) indicates a lower-valued patent in a well developed area.  
 
We now turn to our focus variables that capture the role of patent portfolio size, the size of 
potential disputants, and technology field concentration. 
Ownership : We identify each patent owner as an individual, an unlisted company, or a listed 
company.8 Individual and firm owners are indicated as such in the PTO data, and each firm is 
assigned a patent is given a company code by the PTO.   To identify firms listed on the stock market, 
we use the concordance between PTO company codes and Standard and Poor’s CUSIP identification 
codes developed by Bronwyn Hall and Adam Jaffe. This concordance is based on the 1989 industry 
structure.  We call a patent-owning company “listed” if we can identify it as having a code at that 
time.9 Unlisted companies are typically smaller than listed ones, but there is wide within-group 
variation. Individuals and listed companies are more predominantly domestic (81.0 and 95.6 percent, 
respectively) than unlisted companies (60.4 percent). We also break down listed firms into “large” 
firms (those with employment above the median of 5425) and “small” firms with employment below 
the median.  Unless otherwise noted, we classify the nearly 40 percent of firms without employment 
data as large firms because they have similar litigation and settlement patterns. 
Patent Portfolio Size:  The PTO company codes allow us to construct a measure of the size of 
a patent owner’s portfolio, as it looks during the period a patent would likely be involved in a dispute. 
The relevant portfolio is defined as the set of patents held by the patent owner having an application 
date within ten years in either direction of the patent in question.  Notice that this portfolio size 
variable may differ across patents, for a given company.  Not surprisingly, domestic listed companies 
tend to have larger portfolios - roughly a third of patents owned by domestic listed companies are in 
                                                 
8 A small share of patents is assigned to institutions, such as universities, hospitals or governments. 
We treat these as unlisted companies. 
9 Two points are worth noting here. First, companies that merge after 1989 stop accumulating patent 
portfolios because their subsequent patenting is listed under a different (merged company) code.  
Second, any listed company that is started after 1989 will not have a CUSIP in our data and thus will 
be coded as an unlisted company. 
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portfolios in each of size groups 1-100, 100-900 and >900 patents. By contrast, about 90 percent of 
patents owned by domestic unlisted companies, and two-thirds of patents owned by foreign 
companies, are in portfolios with fewer than 100 patents. 
 Relative Size of Potential Disputants:  We construct a measure of the asymmetry in portfolio 
size between a patentee and the “representative” disputant he can expect to face on each patent.  
Disputes will typically occur between firms engaged in similar lines of research.  Such firms are also 
more likely to cite each other’s patents as prior art.  Therefore, we identify firms patenting in the same 
technology areas as a given patent’s forward citations as the likely potential disputants for that 
patent.10 We define size asymmetry as the firm’s total portfolio size divided by a weighted average of 
the portfolio size of firms in classes from which its forward citations come. Formally, let Zcf be the 
portfolio size for firm f in technology class c (including all patents since 1978) and Zc.= S f Zcf all 
patents in the class. Z.f = Sc Zcf  is the portfolio size for firm f, and Z*c.= Zc / nc  is the average portfolio 
size of the nc firms with patents in class c.  The relative portfolio size of firm f for patent i is Rif = Z.f 
/ScwciZ*c., where wci = Fci /F.i is the fraction of forward citations to patent i that falls into technology 
class c.11 For a patentee suing for infringement, being relatively large confers greater threat power 
(e.g., holding cross-licensing of other patents hostage to this dispute) and this should facilitate 
settlement. 
 Technology Concentration:  To measure of concentration in patenting activity in the 
technology area of each patent, we first calculate, for each 2-digit USPC class, a four-firm 
concentration index, measured as the patenting share of the top four firms.  A firm’s share is the size 
of its patent portfolio in that class divided by the sum of all firms’ patents in that class. For each 
patent we then take a weighted average of the concentration indices for the different classes, where 
                                                 
10 This identification is supported by an analysis of actual defendants.  We compare the 3-digit 
classifications of all forward citations of the patent involved in a suit to the technology classes of 
patents owned by actual defendants in that suit.  The share of classes that overlaps varies from 0.16 to 
0.47, depending on the type of innovation.  By contrast, the overlap for a random set of patents from 
the same cohorts is an order of magnitude smaller, ranging from 0.016 to 0.059. 
11 For a patent without any forward citations, the denominator of Relsize is set equal to the average 
portfolio size for other patents in the same 2-digit USPC class. For all individuals, and for about 900 
cases where company patentees had only one patent, we set Relsize equal to zero. 
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the weights are defined as above. Formally, the index for class c is C4c = S f Zcf /Zc., where the sum is 
over the top four firms in terms of shares in that class.  The weighted technology concentration index 
for patent i is then C4i = Sc wci C4c. If a company operates in more concentrated technological areas, it 
faces a greater chance of encountering other firms in patent disputes more than once.  This 
expectation of repeated interaction should lower the litigation rate. 
 
We analyze the litigation process in four stages: 1. the probability that a suit is filed; 2. the 
probability of settlement, conditional on a suit being filed (post-suit settlement); 3. the timing of any 
post-suit settlement; and 4. plaintiff (patentee) win rates, conditional on adjudication at trial.12 If a 
patent dispute is settled before a suit is filed, we do not observe the dispute in the data. Thus a low 
filing rate can either reflect a low rate of infringement (disputes) or a high probability of pre-suit  
settlement. After a suit is filed, settlement can occur before the pre-trial hearing, after the hearing but 
before the trial begins, or during the trial. Otherwise, the trial concludes with a court judgement in 
favor of one of the parties.13  We analyze the timing of case closure in terms of stages, rather than 
months, because patent lawyers have indicated to us that legal costs are more closely related to the 
stages a case reaches than to its actual length (which depends heavily on the availability of court 
resources and other external factors). 
 Information on trial win rates is relevant for assessing overall litigation risk, and thus pricing 
patent insurance. Such information is also useful for testing competing economic models of litigation 
(Waldfogel, 1998; Siegelman and Waldfogel, 1999). There are two main models: divergent 
expectations (DE) and asymmetric information (AI). In DE models (Priest and Klein, 1984), each 
party estimates the quality of his case with error (equivalently, the relevant court decision standard), 
and cases go to trial when one party is sufficiently more optimistic than the other. This occurs most 
                                                 
12 Both parties can win. For example, a court may rule that an infringement occurred but strike down 
the validity of some of the patent claims. When a win for both is recorded, we count it twice, for the 
plaintiff and for the defendant, rather than as a separate category. 
13 Apart from settlement, the court may dismiss the case prior to trial without request of one of the 
parties. We drop these cases from the sample. In this paper we do not distinguish different forms of 
adjudication, such as court verdicts, jury verdicts and directed verdicts. 
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often when true case quality is near the court’s decision standard, and this selection mechanism drives 
plaintiff win rates toward 50 percent.  In AI models (Bebchuk, 1984), the probability that the plaintiff 
will win is private information. An uninformed party makes a settlement offer (or a sequence of 
offers, Spier, 1992), which is accepted by the informed party only when he has a low probability of 
winning at trial. Trials arise in (separating) equilibria because settlement offers have some probability 
of failing due to the information asymmetry. This one-sided selection mechanism predicts that the win 
rate for the informed party should tend toward 100 percent. We show that our data strongly favor the 
divergent expectations model for patent infringement suits. 
 
3. Non-parametric Evidence  
 Table 1 presents estimates of average filing rates for each technology field during three sub-
periods: 1978-84, 1985-90 and 1991-95. We measure filing rates as the number of suits filed per 
thousand patents from a given cohort (application year), and include multiple cases for the same 
patent.14  Rates are based on suits filed through 1999, and then adjusted for truncation due to time lags 
in case filings and under-reporting. 
Mean filing rates vary substantially across technology fields.  Equality across fields is 
strongly rejected (c2(7) = 1,103; p-value < 0.001). For the aggregate (pooled technology field) data, 
there are 19.0 case filings per thousand patents. The lowest rates are found in Chemicals (11.8), 
Electronics (15.4) and Mechanical (16.9). Interestingly, filing rates for pharmaceutical patents are 
only modestly higher than the average. The rates are much higher for patents in Other Health, 
Computers, Biotechnology, and Miscellaneous.  Computers and Biotechnology are both newer areas 
where one might expect there to be greater uncertainty about legal outcomes.15 
                                                 
14 We do not compute rates by case filing year because the population of patents alive in any year (the 
denominator) is unknown since it depends on patent renewals for the preceding cohorts. Further, the 
age structure of the population changes over time as patenting increases, and age and filing rates are 
related. 
15 Filing rates in Table1 include only the main patents in each suit , while there may in fact be several 
patents per suit. We present these calculations because, for filing years before 1990, we only have 
information about the main patents (mixing the subsidiary patents for later years would distort trends). 
“True” rates are even higher than those in Table 1 if one views being a subsidiary patent in a case as 
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 The number of suits filed has been driven up sharply by increasing patenting in all technology 
fields and a shift of patenting toward those with higher litigation rates. The total number of patents 
grew by 71 percent over the period, but in Drugs, Biotechnology, and Medical Instruments patenting 
nearly tripled, and in Computers it grew four-fold. Once the growth in patenting is taken into account, 
the table demonstrates that there has been no trend increase in the filing of suits in any technology 
field over this period. 
Table 2 summarizes mean filing and settlement rates for four ownership categories: 
individuals, domestic unlisted and listed companies, and foreign companies. With 10.4 suits per 
thousand patents, domestic listed companies are far less likely to prosecute infringements than 
unlisted companies and individuals with 35-45 suits. Moreover, filing rates for foreign patentees 
(mostly unlisted firms) are far lower than for their domestic counterparts. The joint null hypothesis 
that average filing rates are the same is decisively rejected (c2 (3) = 11,853; p-value <0.001). 
 Although ownership type has a strong effect on filing rates, it does not affect the probability 
that a suit, once filed, is settled (c2(3) = 4.55; p-value » 0.2). About 95 percent of all patent suits are 
settled by the parties before the end of trial, and most of those before the trial begins, but systematic 
sorting on the ownership dimension occurs before suits are filed. 
Listed firms may have lower filing rates for a number of reasons. Such firms have larger 
patent portfolios, which gives them both experience and the ability to settle disputes by pooling or 
trading intellectual property. 16 If imperfect capital markets limit the capacity of smaller firms to 
finance litigation, larger firms may be better able to settle (and to extract better terms) because they 
pose more credible litigation threats in confronting smaller firms. And when large firms have disputes 
with each other, they are likely to have many points of interaction, especially through competition in 
                                                                                                                                                        
equivalent to being the main litigated patent. One could scale up the filing rates using the ratio of 
subsidiary to main patents, which is 0.24 overall and for individual technology fields: Drugs 0.25, 
Other Health 0.36, Chemicals 0.20, Electronics 0.37, Mechanical 0.20, Computers 0.34, 
Biotechnology 0.46, and Miscellaneous 0.15. 
16 Patenting experience may facilitate settlement if it makes firms better able to assess the quality of 
their cases and likely outcomes in court. Experienced firms may also make higher quality patent 
applications that give rise to fewer disputes in the first place (Graham, et. al., 2001). 
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product markets, which should promote settlement. The detailed patent data enable us to make 
progress in discriminating between these sources of advantage. 
We begin by examining how the probability of litigation (i.e., of being involved in at least one 
suit over the life of the patent) and the probability of post-suit settlement vary with different portfolio 
sizes. To compute these probabilities, we adjust for the fact that patents from large portfolios are 
disproportionately represented in the matched data (since the matching was not stratified by portfolio 
size -Appendix 1 for details). The first column of Table 3 shows that the probability of litigation 
sharply declines with portfolio size.  A formal test confirms this finding (c2(6) = 2,610; p-value < 
0.001). The probability of filing a suit involving a patent in a portfolio with a small number of other 
patents (0-10) is 1.7 percent, compared to about 0.5 percent for a patent in a portfolio with 100-300 
other patents, and only 0.26 percent for those in large portfolios (> 900 patents). These are large 
differences, suggesting that having bigger portfolios confers substantial advantages. 
If firms with larger portfolios have a higher propensity to patent their innovations, and thus 
more patents that are not worth fighting over, it could drive these differences. But the evidence 
contradicts this hypothesis. Portfolio size is positively , and significantly, correlated with forward 
citations and forward citations per claim.  The correlation coefficients are 0.10 and 0.06, respectively 
(computed using the matched sample and cohorts 1978-1988 to avoid spurious correlation due to both 
portfolio size and citations being truncated). Even in electronics, where firms have been described as 
following a patent harvesting strategy, there is no evidence that the average quality of patents falls in 
larger portfolios. We conclude that the link between litigation probability and portfolio size reflects 
advantages that large portfolios give to firms in settling disputes. 
To distinguish between the advantages of portfolio size and firm size, we separate unlisted, 
and small and large publicly listed domestic firms.17 The litigation probability declines with portfolio 
size within each ownership type, at least in terms of the point estimates.  However, it is by far more 
precipitous for domestic unlisted companies. For a patent owned by such a company and in a portfolio 
                                                 
17 Listed firms that could not be classified because they lack employment data are not included in this 
table. 
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of 0-10 other patents, the average probability of being involved in litigation is 2.6 percent, while for 
patents in the same sized portfolio but owned by listed domestic companies it is less than one percent.  
At the same time, there is little evidence that size - either in terms of public listing or employment - 
matters once more than about 100 patents are held. These relationships hold in each of the technology 
fields (not reported). 
The final column presents the average probability of settlement, conditional on a suit being 
filed, for different portfolio sizes.  As in Table 2, we observe only small differences in the post-suit 
settlement rates. The differences across portfolio size are marginally statistically significant in the 
pooled data (c2(6) = 14.2; p-value » 0.05), and insignificant in tests controlling for ownership type 
(Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001b). 
 To summarize, the likelihood of filing a suit (i.e., not settling beforehand) is much higher for 
patents owned by individuals and unlisted companies, and for patentees with smaller patent portfolios. 
But these differences do not appear in post-suit settlement rates. Thus almost all of the sorting among 
patent disputes occurs before suits are filed, not afterwards in the courts. 
 We now turn to the timing of such settlements and the win rates for cases that are adjudicated 
at trial. Table 4 presents this information by ownership type. About 80 percent of all suits that are ever 
settled (without third party adjudication) are settled before a pre-trial hearing is held. This suggests 
that the filing of a suit sends a strong signal about the seriousness of the plaintiff to use legal means, 
and quickly triggers resolution before substantial legal costs are incurred.18 Nearly all of the 
remaining settlement occurs before the trial commences. As with the likelihood of settlement itself, 
the timing of settlements differs little by ownership type.  
The table also shows the trial win rates (for infringement suits).  Win rates are close to 50 
percent, as predicted by the divergent expectations model of litigation. They are sharply inconsistent 
with the win rates of either zero or 100 percent predicted by asymmetric information models.  
 
                                                 
18 Pooling all cases, the median period before settlement occurs (in months) is 8, 16, and 25 for those 
settling before pre-trial hearing, after a hearing but before trial, and after trial, respectively. 
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4. Econometric Analysis  
In this section we present probit regressions of the probability of infringement suits and post-
suit settlement for the pooled data.19  We use the Derwent data as the basis for the sample and then 
include, in both estimations, only those cases linked to the FJC database and therefore having 
outcomes information. In analyzing the determinants of the litigation probability  (filing of suits), we 
do not count multiple cases involving the same patent. We do this to avoid undue influence by a few 
patentees that might sue many infringers in separate but related cases. We include multiple cases in 
the econometric analysis of suit outcomes for three reasons: this is appropriate if the purpose is  to 
assess litigation risk for pricing patent insurance; it is unclear how one would choose the 
“representative” suit when there are multiple cases; and the sample size for outcomes (especially 
trials) is relatively small even when we include multiple cases.  
 Table 5 contains variable definitions. Though the original matching controls for the effects of 
cohort and technology, we include technology group controls in the regressions because the samples 
used here differ somewhat. Table 6 presents the parameter estimates and the marginal effect of each 
variable on the population probability of litigation for a randomly drawn patent (at matched sample 
mean characteristics).20 For comparison, the mean litigation probability is 0.0135. We first summarize 
the results for the control variables, and then focus on the main variables of interest. 
 The probability of litigation increases with the number of claims and forward citations per 
claim, and the effects are substantial.  At means, the elasticity of the litigation probability with respect 
to the number of claims is 0.31. The fact that the elasticity is much less than one is interesting because 
it indicates that the standard procedure of pricing patent litigation insurance on a per claim basis is 
inappropriate. In contrast, the likelihood of a suit falls with the number of backward citations per 
claim. The effect is small, but the finding is consistent with the view that backward citations are an 
                                                 
19 Results are similar for declaratory judgement suits (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001b). 
20 Since the sample litigation rate is close to 40 percent by construction, we deflate the sample 
marginal effects using a conversion factor to obtain those appropriate for a randomly drawn patent in 
the population (see Appendix 2). Marginal effects for ownership dummy variables include portfolio 
interactions.  They are constructed so that the alternative to a given ownership category is a weighted 
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indication that the patent is in an already well-developed technology area where uncertainty about 
property rights is less likely to cause disputes. 
The coefficient on the variable Fwdself , the percentage of citations that are self-citations, is 
positive and significant. By contrast, greater backward self-citation (Bwdself ) significantly reduces the 
likelihood of litigation. This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that self-citation indicates the 
presence of a “cumulative innovation” by the patentee, and that there is complementarity among 
technologically related patents in a firm’s portfolio that raises the willingness to protect the property 
rights of the key, early inventions in the chain. 
This first set of findings confirms the importance of patent value in determining litigation risk 
and related opposition proceedings within patent offices (see also Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001a; 
Graham, et.al., 2001; and Harhoff and Reitzig, 2000). 
 Using a sample of biotechnology patents, Lerner (1994) found that patents with uses in many 
technological areas – “broad” patents - are more likely to be litigated.  In our more comprehensive 
and more recent data, a similar measure is also significant, but with the opposite sign. A ten percent 
increase in No3USPC (the mean is 2.2) reduces the litigation probability by about 1.7 percent.21  It 
may be that it is harder to detect infringements when a patented innovation is used in more technology 
areas, and that this dominates any increase in the number of potential infringers. 
 We turn now to the core results. The most important is that the probability of litigation is 
negatively related to the size of the patent portfolio, with an elasticity (at means) of -0.13. The 
marginal effect declines with portfolio size, but the point estimate is negative over most of the sample 
range.  Having a larger portfolio of patents reduces the probability of being involved in a suit on any 
individual patent. 
                                                                                                                                                        
average of the other categories, with weights reflecting their representation in the matched sample.  
Marginal effects for variables with quadratic terms are given as a composite. 
21 The point estimates in the separate technology fields (not reported) are negative and statistically 
significant in five cases, negative but insignificant in two, and positive but insignificant in one. 
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Being part of a large patent portfolio is much less important for drug patents.22  The estimated 
coefficient on a dummy for non-drug technology fields (PortNondrug) is negative and large relative 
to the baseline portfolio effect.  It implies that the marginal benefit of portfolio size on the litigation 
probability is nearly twice as large for non-drug patents as compared to drug patents (compare 
Portsize and PortNondrug). This finding is consistent with the idea that trading intellectual property is 
especially important in areas where innovation is “complex” in the sense that it may rely on multiple 
components or research tools that may be patented by other firms. This feature has been less 
important in the pharmaceutical industry.23 
We allow for a set of interactions between portfolio size and firm ownership type (large 
domestic listed companies are the left out category). Controlling for other factors, the point estimates 
again strongly support the hypothesis that company size affects the importance of having larger patent 
portfolios. For a small domestic listed company (DLIST-S) with the mean portfolio size (1,420 
patents), the marginal effect of portfolio size on the probability of litigation is about eight times larger 
than for a large listed company with the same portfolio (compare marginal effects for Portsize and 
PortDLIST-S).  The marginal effect of portfolio size for small listed firms is even greater than that for 
unlisted firms. 
Moreover, we easily reject the hypothesis that there are no ownership differences in the 
probability of involvement in an infringement suit when controlling for other factors (?²(6) = 978.8, p-
value < 0.001).  The pattern of marginal effects points to five main findings.  First, foreign individuals 
and unlisted (smaller) companies are much less likely to engage in infringement suits than their 
domestic counterparts. Comparing the marginal effects of FIND and DIND, the probability of 
litigation is much lower - by 1.2 percentage points - for foreign individuals than for their domestic 
counterparts. Comparing foreign and domestic unlisted companies (FUNLIST and DUNLIST), the 
                                                 
22 Separate estimations by technology field (not reported) suggested this hypothesis. Other differences 
in estimated portfolio coefficients across technology were not statistically significant. 
23 Harhoff and Reitzig (2000) find that larger portfolios reduce the probability of opposition 
proceedings at the European Patent Office.  Using related technology definitions, Somaya (2001) 
finds that portfolio size has a significant negative effect on U.S. litigation involving computer patents, 
but an insignificant effect for patents in research medicine. 
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difference is even greater - almost two percentage points. Second, larger domestic and foreign listed 
companies are equally likely to file suits. Third, domestic individuals, unlisted and small listed 
companies are equally likely to litigate (the differences in point estimates are not statistically 
significant). Fourth, domestic individuals and unlisted companies are more likely - by about one 
percentage point - to litigate than large domestic listed firms (DLIST-L).  Finally, small listed 
companies are more likely to file suits than larger ones, again the difference being about one 
percentage point. To summarize, we find the following ranking: {DLIST-S, DUNLIST, DIND} > 
{DLIST-L, FLIST} > {FIND, FUNLIST}. 
Since these effects are conditional on portfolio and company size (both of which relate to the 
cost of settling), the lower rate of litigation for foreign owners should reflect two main factors: the 
cost of pursuing U.S. court actions and access to information about potential infringements. We 
expect that the cost of litigating for domestic patentees is less than (or equal to) that for foreign 
patentees, and that it is harder for foreign owners to detect infringements in the United States. If so, 
domestic owners should litigate more often than their foreign counterparts and this is what we find, 
except for listed companies.  This exception is not surprising, since foreign firms that are listed, with a 
presence in the United States, are less likely to be disadvantaged in terms of litigation costs and access 
to information. 
The technology concentration variable, C4, provides additional evidence that the expectation 
of repeated interaction promotes settlement. If a company operates in concentrated area there is a 
greater chance that it will be involved in disputes with the same firms, allowing them to develop ways 
to resolve disputes cooperatively. As predicted, the estimated coefficient on C4 is negative and highly 
significant.  A ten percent increase in the index reduces the probability of a suit by 4.6 percent.24 
 The litigation probability is also influenced by the asymmetry in portfolio size between the 
patent owner and likely disputants (Relsize), which we interpret as reflecting the patentee’s threat 
power. As expected, if a patent owner is large relative to typical disputants, the probability of a case 
                                                 
24 Higher concentration could indicate a more mature technology with less valuable innovation.  Thus it is 
important that the regressions control for patent value in order to distinguish between these interpretations. 
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filing is lower. However, the effect is not large - a ten percent increase in relative size lowers the 
litigation probability by just 0.5 percent. 
 Table 7 highlights the huge heterogeneity in litigation risk implied by these estimation results.  
We calculate the probability of an infringement suit for each patent in the matched sample, given the 
patent’s full set of characteristics. Percentile cutoffs for the distribution of these probabilities are 
given in the first row of the table. The probability of litigation for the median patent is just under one 
percent. However, among the top one percent of patents (99th percentile), the probability of 
involvement in a suit is over eight percent. The table shows that the rates can be far higher when 
patents are segregated into different technology and ownership groups. The top percentile of patents 
in areas that are most at risk have probabilities of litigation over 15 percent (see Other Health, 
Computers and Biotechnology).  Similarly, the top one percent of all patents held by domestic 
unlisted firms have litigation risks of well over 10 percent. Since evidence from patent renewal data 
and firm surveys indicates that private value of innovations is highly skewed - with most value 
attributable to the top patents - it is precisely the litigation risk in these top percentiles that is relevant 
for how enforcement costs affect R&D incentives. 
 Finally, we turn to the econometric analysis of several post-suit outcomes. In estimating these 
regressions, we do not control for selection. Rather, we ask: given any selection that occurs, is there 
any remaining association between patent and patentee characteristics and the outcomes? For 
purposes of assessing ex ante  litigation risk (e.g., for patenting decisions or insurance pricing), this is 
the relevant question. 25 
 The evidence presented in the previous section indicated that the main characteristics of 
patents and their owners do not affect the probability of settlement after a suit is filed, nor the plaintiff 
win rates for cases that reach trial. Probit regressions for settlement and win rates confirm this 
conclusion. For brevity we summarize the findings but do not present the parameter estimates. The 
settlement regression has a meager pseudo-R2 of 0.01. The null hypothesis that the regression as a 
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whole is insignificant is not rejected (c2(29) = 39.7; p-value = 0.089). The only positive finding is that 
the coefficients on three technology field dummies are significant and indicate that the settlement 
probability is about eight percentage points higher for patents in Electronics, Mechanical and 
Miscellaneous.26  The probit regression for win rates has a pseudo-R2 of 0.02 and is statistically 
insignificant (c2(28) = 19.7; p-value = 0.90), as are the individual coefficients. Based on our 
discussions with staff at the FJC, there is no reason to believe that the data on settlements and plaintiff 
win rates are systematically bad (these outcome data are recorded at different times and in many 
different courts). We are confident that the “insignificance” of these regressions is meaningful: i.e., 
settlement and win rate outcomes are almost completely independent of observed characteristics of 
patents and their owners. 
 The probability that the settlement of infringement suits occurs early (before the pre-trial 
hearing) is also unrelated to most characteristics of the patent and its owner, with three noteworthy 
exceptions (the probit is significant: c2(29) = 50.5, p-value = 0.008).  First, early settlement is more 
likely if the patent in dispute is part of a larger portfolio. This is consistent with our earlier result that 
portfolio size makes filing a suit less likely in the first place.  Second, patent owners that are large 
relative to a representative disputant (Relsize) are less likely to settle early. Greater technology 
concentration (C4) also makes early settlement somewhat less likely. Recall that the probability of a 
suit filing is lower when the relative size of the patentee is larger, which we interpret as reflecting 
greater threat power. But if the (implicit) threats do not succeed in preventing the need to file suit, it 
may be important for the patentee to carry out those threats in order to maintain credibility (post-suit 
“toughness”). Simila rly, if the discipline of repeated interaction has failed to keep firms in a 
                                                                                                                                                        
25 Controlling for filing selection would be appropriate if one wanted to infer the effect of 
characteristics on outcomes should a random sample of patents be subjected to suits. Evidence that 
there is a sample selection effect is mixed (Somaya 2001). 
26 It is also interesting to note that, if we restrict attention to suits where the patentee is identified as 
the plaintiff, then those suits involving smaller patentees (unlisted firms and domestic individuals) are 
significantly less likely to settle.  These are patentees who do not have an exclusive licensee or late 
assignee litigating in their place.  As plaintiffs they are more likely to be inexperienced and more 
attached to their innovations than owners who have licensed or sold out.  Both characteristics could 
impede settlement. 
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concentrated area out of court in the first place, the dispute is probably very intractable.  Both could 
delay any post-suit settlement, and this is what we find. 
 
5. Implications  for Pricing Patent Litigation Insurance  
Our findings that patent portfolio size and technology concentration significantly affect 
litigation risk have important implications for R&D incentives. The threat of costly enforcement can 
affect R&D investment and patenting strategies (Waterson, 1990; Lerner, 1995). This is especially so 
for small, high technology firms that are more likely to face capital market constraints (Himmelfarb 
and Petersen, 1994). Shapiro (2001) emphasizes that firms rely heavily on cross-licensing 
arrangements and patent pools as a way of mitigating these problems of the anti-commons 
(fragmented property rights). But small firms are effectively blocked from using these arrangements 
unless cash payments are accepted for participation, and typically they are not. 
One potential alternative for small firms is to rely on patent litigation insurance. This has been 
available in the United States and Europe for more than a decade, but the market remains severely 
under-developed.27 The central problem is that the level and structure of pricing need to be 
rationalized. The level of prices is very high - Kaplan (2001) reports that, as a rule of thumb, the 
annual premium for an insured of average risk is about 6-7 percent of the coverage. This is much 
higher than the litigation risk we estimate, even for the most exposed patents. In our data the average 
probability of engaging in at least one infringement suit over the entire lifetime of a patent is 1.35 
percent; rising to eight percent for the 99th percentile (Table 7). Including also suits for declaratory 
judgement, the total number of expected cases involving a given patent, over its lifetime, is just 1.9 
per hundred patents (Table 1). Second, insurers typically set the premium on the basis of the coverage 
per claim (which is normally the same as the maximum aggregate coverage allowed). But as we 
showed earlier, the litigation probability varies much less than proportionally to the number of claims, 
so patents with more claims are being ‘overpriced.’ Finally, the huge heterogeneity in litigation risk, 
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illustrated in Table 7, is not systematically reflected in insurance premiums. Insurers make some 
attempt to differentiate prices on the basis of detailed examination of patents, but this is extremely 
costly. The empirical work in this paper provides insurance companies with a useful starting point for 
rationalizing prices in a more systematic, and less expensive, way and thereby for mitigating adverse 
selection. 28  
As protection for insurers, policies often have payback provisions under which the insured 
party absorbs (part of) the litigation costs from monetary payoffs from settlement or trial, and in some 
cases the insurer shares in those payoffs. This raises a second key problem, which is how to assign 
control rights over when to accept settlement offers. In most policies we have examined, the insurer 
retains some measure of control rights, but these rights are often vaguely specified and expose patent 
holders to a form of ex post hold-up. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
We analyze the determinants of patent infringement suits, and their outcomes, by linking 
detailed information from the U.S. patent office to data from the U.S. federal court system, the 
Derwent database and industry sources.  The linked data allow us to construct a suitable controlled 
random sample of the population of potential disputants. The data set we construct is the most 
comprehensive yet available, covering all patent suits in the United States reported by the federal 
courts during the period 1978-1999. 
     A major finding in the paper is that all of the sorting among patent disputes on observed 
characteristics occurs in the decision to file suits. The key post-suit outcomes do not depend on these 
characteristics. From a policy perspective, this is good news because it means that enforcement of 
patent rights relies on the effective threat of court action more than on extensive legal proceedings. 
                                                                                                                                                        
27 For discussion of patent litigation insurance experience, see Danish Ministry of Trade and Industry 
(2001). See also Kaplan (2001). Lloyds of London, for example, offered patent litigation insurance in 
the 1980’s but discontinued the policy due to lack of profitability. 
28 Most of the variables in the analysis are completely, or largely, out of the control of the patentee.  
Before linking insurance prices to observable characteristics, consideration would need to be given to 
the patentee’s ability to manipulate them. 
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This feature is reinforced by high post-suit settlement rates and the fact that most settlement occurs 
quickly, often before a pre-trial hearing is held.  These findings mean that the enforcement of patent 
rights minimizes the use of judicial resources for resolving disputes. The bad news is that individuals 
and small companies are much more likely to be involved in suits conditional on the characteristics of 
their patents, and this is not offset by a more rapid resolution of their suits.We also show that 
patentees are better able to avoid going to court when they have a portfolio of intellectual property, 
orwhere there are other features of the environment that promote “cooperative” behavior. In this 
sense, small firms are at a disadvantage in protecting their intellectual property. But the fact that 
heterogeneity in litigation risk is measurable offers the prospect of developing a market for more 
affordable patent litigation insurance.  
An important direction for future research is to explore the dynamic aspects of conflict 
between firms over intellectual property assets. This would include studying multiple (sequential) 
suits on the same patent between different parties, and multiple suits on different patents involving the 
same parties. Initial work along these lines for a sample of cases is found in Somaya (2001). To make 
further progress, we are undertaking a project to match litigants across all patent cases. When 
completed, these data will provide information about the role of reputation building in settlement 
negotiations. In addition one could use our empirical estimates of litigation risk, together with 
information on legal costs at different stages of the litigation process, to calculate the ex ante, direct 
costs of enforcing patent rights. Theoretical work is needed to understand how patent litigation 
insurance markets affects strategic interaction and settlement outcomes among firms. This would 
enable us to measure the indirect costs of enforcing patent rights, and hence the total effect of 
enforcement on R&D incentives.  
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Appendix 1.  Computing Population Filing Probabilities by Portfolio Size, and their 
Variance 
 
 
 Let Lgz, Mgz and Ngz denote, respectively, the number of patents in the litigated and matched 
samples and in the population that are in portfolios of size z and from group g, where the latter is 
defined by technology field, cohort, and ownership type.  True filing probabilities in the population 
are p*gz, which can be estimated by pgz = [Lgz / Ngz].  We cannot calculate pgz directly as Ngz is 
unobserved.  However, since the matched sample is random with respect to portfolio size, we can use 
the sample share of the patents in group g that are in portfolios of size z, gzsˆ = [Mgz/ Mg], as an 
unbiased estimator of the population share [Ngz/ Ng].  Using this, our estimator is: 
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[Lgz / Ng ] = gzpˆ  is also an estimate of an underlying probability, say pgz, with an associated sampling 
variance. Taking a Taylor expansion, we can capture both sources of error in the following 
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where the covariance terms are zero because the two sources of sampling error are independent.  This 
simplifies to: 
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Filing probabilities at a more aggregated level are calculated as a weighted average of these rates, 
with weights based on Mg. 
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Appendix 2.  Deriving Population Litigation Probabilities and Marginal Effects 
2.1 Population Litigation Probabilities 
 
We define classes by characteristics with respect to which the sampling was non-random:  
technology groups, cohort, infringement suits, and declaratory judgement suits.  Let P(Xc) denote the 
population probability of litigation for a patent in class c with a vector of other characteristics Xc and 
let Q(Xc) be the corresponding probability in the pooled (litigated and matched) sample.  P(Xc) and 
Q(Xc) differ because the matched sample was constructed so that the overall litigation probability is 
fifty percent, controlling for technology and cohort.  We want to infer P(Xc) from the estimated value 
of Q(Xc). 
First we determine the extent to which we must inflate the matched sample for a given class 
to have it reflect the number of patents in that class in the population.  Let Q represent the aggregate 
sample litigation probability for a given class: 
Q = L / (L + M), 
where L and M denote the number of litigated and matched patents in the sample.  The population 
probability is 
P = L /N, 
where the number of litigated patents is the same in both cases since the sample contains all (reported) 
litigated patents, and N is the total number of patents in the class in the population.  Thus, 
N = {Q/(1-Q)P}M º KM 
Within a class, the matched patents are random draws so the distribution of characteristics in the 
matched sample is the same as the population.  Thus the expected number of matched patents with 
characteristics Xc in the population, N(Xc), is greater than in the sample by the inflation factor, K, and 
so equals KM(Xc).  Letting L(Xc) be the number of litigated patents with characteristics Xc, the 
expected population probability of litigation for such patents is 
P(Xc) = L(Xc)/[KM(Xc)]. 
Similarly, Q(Xc) = L(Xc)/[L(Xc) + M(Xc)].  Solving for M and substituting, we get the result: 
       P(Xc) = Q(Xc)/[K(1-Q(Xc))]    (A.2.1) 
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2.2  Population Marginal Effects 
For each characteristic Xk, the population marginal effect is 
¶P(Xc)/¶Xkc = [dP(Xc)/dQ(Xc)] ¶Q(Xc)/¶Xkc 
The last term is the sample marginal effect computed from the probit regression.  From the expression 
for P(Xc) we get 
dP(Xc)/dQ(Xc) = 1/K[1-Q(Xc)]2 
Measuring Q(Xc) by the sample probability of litigation in the class, Q, we get the result: 
dP(Xc)/dQ(Xc) » P/Q(1-Q) 
We measure P for each class as follows:  For the denominator, we take the total number of patents is 
the class during 1978-1995.  In the numerator we use the number of infringement suits that can be 
directly identified, and all unidentified suits.  These are inflated for under-reporting and truncation.  
We then calculate marginal adjustment factors by USPC groups.  Separate classes defined by cohort 
are not used because of our finding that litigation probabilities have been similar over time within 
technology areas. Because dP(Xc)/dQ(Xc) is the same for all Xk for a given class c, all sample marginal 
effects are adjusted by the same factor to convert them to population marginals. The aggregate 
conversion factor is used in Table 6. 
Conversion Factors to Estimate Population Marginal Effects  
Aggregate .048 
Drugs .050 
Other Health .089 
Chemicals .031 
Electronics .038 
Mechanical .045 
Computers .063 
Biotechnology .076 
Miscellaneous .084 
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Table 1.  Filing Rates by Technology Fields and Cohort Groups  
     
 Filing Rate (cases per thousand) 
 
 Total: 1978-95 1978-84 1985-90 1991-1995 
Technology Field 
(percent of sample) 
    
Aggregate 19.0 19.3 16.6 21.1 
(100.0) (0.21) (0.31) (0.28) (0.44) 
     
Drugs 22.2 22.5 18.9 24.3 
(5.6) (1.05) (1.62) (1.34) (1.97) 
     
Other Health 34.6 48.2 35.2 27.3 
(8.0) (1.33) (2.67) (1.98) (2.23) 
     
Chemicals 11.8 11.6 10.9 13.0 
(13.4) (0.35) (0.50) (0.49) (0.80) 
     
Electronics 15.4 16.2 13.1 16.8 
(18.7) (0.40) (0.61) (0.51) (0.79) 
     
Mechanical 16.9 17.7 14.5 18.7 
(27.7) (0.2) (0.53) (0.46) (0.79) 
     
Computers 25.6 32.6 21.2 25.9 
(1.8) (2.25) (4.24) (2.80) (3.78) 
     
Biotechnology 27.9 33.3 27.6 25.5 
(0.9) (3.36) (6.13) (5.16) (5.52) 
     
Miscellaneous 34.2 32.4 28.9 40.7 
(23.9) (0.76) (1.10) (0.98) (1.66) 
 
Notes:  Percent of sample is the breakdown of litigated patents from cohorts 1978-95. Estimated filing 
rates including multiple suits involving the same patent.  Figures use data for suits filed through 1999, 
adjusted for under-reporting and truncation.  Estimated standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 2.  Filing and Settlement Rates, by Ownership Type  
     
 Individuals Domestic Unlisted Domestic Listed Foreign Firms 
Filing Rate  35.2 46.0 10.4 4.2 
(cases/thousand) (0.65) (0.78) (0.27) (0.16) 
     
Settlement Rate  94.7 94.0 94.1 94.5 
(percent) (1.4) (0.4) (0.7) (0.9) 
 
Notes:  Foreign firms include listed and unlisted companies.  The filing rate is the estimated number 
of suits per thousand patents from cohorts 1978-1995 (as in Table 1).  The settlement rate is the 
fraction of filed cases reported to have been settled at some time prior to court judgment, according to 
the FJC.  Settlement rates are computed for suits filed during the period 1978-1992 to minimize 
truncation bias and include only infringement suits.  Estimated standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 3.  Probabilities of Litigation and Settlement 
 
Probability of: Litigation Settlement 
  
 
Aggregate  
Large 
Domestic 
Listed 
Small 
Domestic 
Listed 
 
Domestic 
Unlisted 
 
 
Aggregate 
Portfolio Size            
0-10 1.71 (0.05) 0.55 (0.26) 1.09  (0.49) 2.63  (0.09) 95.0 (0.5) 
11-100 1.20 (0.05) 1.16 (0.25) 1.78  (0.32) 2.00  (0.09) 93.3 (0.7) 
101-200 0.52 (0.05) 0.70 (0.14) 0.77  (0.28) 0.67  (0.12) 93.0 (1.7) 
201-300 0.43 (0.06) 0.49 (0.17) 0.82  (0.32) 0.84  (0.27) 97.0 (1.3) 
301-600 0.39 (0.04) 0.54 (0.10) 0.70  (0.31) 0.56  (0.10) 90.9 (1.9) 
601-900 0.34 (0.04) 0.62 (0.10) 0.44  (0.25) 0.34  (0.12) 93.3 (2.5) 
>900 0.26 (0.01) 0.39 (0.02) Nc  0.37  (0.06) 93.2 (1.1) 
 
Notes:  The probability of litigation is the estimated number of patents involved in suits (multiple 
suits not counted) per hundred patents, adjusted for under-reporting and truncation and for the over-
representation of patents from large portfolios (Appendix 1). ‘nc’ denotes an empty cell.  See also 
notes to Table 2. 
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Table 4. Timing of Settlement and Trial Win Rates, by Ownership Type  
 
 Domestic 
Listed 
Domestic 
Unlisted 
 
Foreign Firms 
 
Individuals 
Timing of settlement (%)     
 
Before pre-trial hearing 
 
81.2 
 
83.0 
 
78.8 
 
84.7 
 (1.2) (0.7) (1.7) (0.8) 
Before Tria l 18.0 15.5 19.9 14.2 
 (1.2) (0.7) (1.7) (1.8) 
During Trial 0.8 1.5 1.3 1.1 
 (0.3) (0.2) (0.5) (1.9) 
 
Plaintiff win rate at trial 51.2 49.1 42.7 46.5 
 (3.8) (2.3) (4.9) (2.3) 
 
Notes:  The timing of settlements is computed on the basis of all infringement cases filed during the 
period 1978-1992 and terminated by settlement before or during trial, according to the FJC.  Cases 
that proceed beyond trial (e.g., on appeal or remand, which are about 5%) are not included.  The 
plaintiff win rate is the number of infringement cases where the court judgment favors the patentee 
divided by the total number of cases.  When the FJC reports a judgment in favor of both parties, we 
treat it as a win for each party and adjust the total appropriately.  Estimated standard errors in 
parentheses are based on the binomial formula. 
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Table 5.  Variable Definitions  
 
Claims Number of claims in the patent specification 
Fwd cites/claim Number of citations to the patent by 
subsequent patents, divided by claims. 
Bwd cites/claim Number of citations to prior patents in the 
patent specification, divided by claims. 
Fwdself Percentage of forward citations that are from 
patents owned by the same company code.  
For individuals it is set to zero. 
Bwdself Percentage of backward citations that are to 
patents owned by the same company. For 
individuals it is set to zero. 
No3USPC Number of unique three-digit technology 
classes to which the patent is assigned by the 
patent office examiner. 
Portsize Number of other patents owned by the same 
assignee that have an application year within a 
ten-year window of the application year of the 
patent in question.  For individuals it is set to 
one. 
PortNondrug Portsize times an indicator variable that is one 
if the patent is not a drug innovation, zero if it 
is a drug innovation. 
PortUNLIST Portsize times UNLIST (see below) 
PortFLIST Portsize times FLIST (see below)  
PortDLIST-S Portsize times DLIST-S (see below) 
Tech. Concentration (C4) C4 concentration of patenting activity – 
weighted average over the technology areas of 
the patent’s forward citations. 
Relsize Total portfolio size of the patent owner 
divided by a weighted average of portfolio 
sizes of firms in the technology areas of the 
patent’s forward citations. 
FIND Foreign (non-U.S.) individual 
DIND Domestic (U.S.) individual 
FUNLIST Foreign company assignee without a Standard 
& Poor’s CUSIP code 
DUNLIST Domestic company assignee without an S&P 
CUSIP code 
FLIST Foreign publicly listed company (with an 
S&P CUSIP code) 
DLIST-S Domestic publicly listed company with < the 
median number of employees for such firms 
(5,425) 
DLIST-L Domestic publicly listed company with ³ the 
median number of employees. 
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Table 6. Probit Estimation of Litigation Probability for Infringement Suits 
Variable  Parameter Marginal Variable  Parameter Marginal 
Claims 0.023 0.00034 FIND -0.54 -0.0058 
 (0.001)   (0.09)  
Claims2 (x 103) -0.024  DIND 0.13 0.0067 
 (0.002)   (0.08)  
Fwd cites/claim 0.19 0.028 FUNLIST -0.69 -0.0106 
 (0.008)   (0.08)  
[Fwd cites/claim]2  (x 103) -4.38  DUNLIST 0.21 0.0091 
 (0.32)   (0.08)  
Bwd cites/claim -0.056 -0.00082 FLIST -0.15 0.0003 
 (0.010)   (0.19)  
[Bwd cites/claim]2  (x 103) 0.89  DLIST-S 0.27 0.0082 
 (0.43)   (0.11)  
Fwdself 0.51 0.0082 DLIST-L -0.23 -0.0014 
 (0.058)   (0.08)  
Bwdself -0.31 -0.0048 Tech. Concentration (C4) -4.17 -0.049 
 (0.08)   (.23)  
No3USPC -0.068 -0.0011 Relsize (x 103) -3.1 -0.065 
 (.008)   (1.12)  
Portsize (x 103) -0.104 -0.0012    
 (0.037)     
Portsize2 (x 106) 0.009     
 (0.001)     
PortNondrug (x 103) -0.061 -0.001    
 (0.033)  No. Observations 17,443  
PortUNLIST (x 103) -0.027 -0.00043 Pseudo-R2 0.162  
 (0.013)  c2 3858.3  
PortFLIST (x 103) 0.001 0.0001    
 (0.020)     
PortDLIST-S (x 103) -0.6 -0.0096    
 (.27)     
Notes:  Estimated standard errors in parentheses.  Numbers in bold are significant at the 0.01 level.  Population marginals calculated as described in Appendix 
2. 
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Table 7.  Predicted Probabilities of Infringement Suits 
Percentile of Distribution: 99th 95th 50th 
    
Aggregate 7.9% 3.8% 0.8% 
    
Technology Field    
Drugs 9.4% 3.9% 0.9% 
Other Health 19.5 6.1 1.7 
Chemicals 4.2 2.1 0.5 
Electronics 7.1 2.8 0.5 
Mechanical 6.5 2.8 0.7 
Computers 14.8 4.5 0.6 
Biotechnology 12.9 6.3 1.3 
Miscellaneous 8.3 4.6 1.9 
    
Ownership Type and Portfolio    
Domestic Individual 9.4% 4.4% 1.9% 
 
Domestic Unlisted 13.7 5.9 1.9 
          Portfolio £ 600 patents 14.4 6.3 2.1 
                         > 600 6.8 2.4 0.7 
 
Small Domestic Listed 6.3 5.4 1.8 
          Portfolio £ 600 patents 6.3 5.4 2.0 
                         > 600 3.5 3.5 0.8 
 
Large Domestic Listed 4.8 2.0 0.5 
          Portfolio £ 600 patents 5.4 2.6 0.9 
                         > 600 4.1 1.5 0.4 
 
Foreign Listed 2.5 1.4 0.3 
Foreign Individual 4.2 1.4 0.6 
Foreign Unlisted 1.4 0.8 0.3 
 
Note: The distributions are calculated by computing sample probabilities using the parameter 
estimates in Table 6, and then deflating to population probabilities using Appendix equation (A.2.1). 
 
